Abstract: Designing programmable privacy logic frameworks that correspond to social, ethical and legal norms has been a fundamentally hard problem. Contextual integrity (CI) [1] offers a model for conceptualizing privacy that is able to bridge technical design with ethical, legal, and policy approaches. While CI is capable of capturing the various components of contextual privacy in theory, no framework thus far has captured, encoded and verifiably enforced these norms in practice. Our paper proposes a novel privacy-preserving framework for crowdsourcing majoritarian privacy norms that are based on the language of CI. By conducting an extensive number of surveys on Amazon's Mechanical Turk (AMT), we demonstrate that crowdsourcing can provide a meaningful approach for extracting a significant percentage of operational informational norms based on majoritarian consensus. These norms are then encoded using Datalog logic specification to develop an information system, which can verify whether information follows are appropriate -and the privacy of users thus preserved -on the basis of the theory of CI.
need in their respective fields of expertise. An important research challenge to enable privacy in real world systems, and a key requirement of the privacy-by-design initiative [2] , is to incorporate conceptions of privacy that model actual societal expectations, which may be expressed in ethical and social norms, as well as the law. The difficulty of this challenge is particularly evident in online information platforms where privacy is often a casualty of complicated information flows not only among participants themselves but also between participants and platform providers [3] [4] [5] .
Contextual integrity (CI) addresses this challenge by offering a model for conceptualizing privacy that is able to bridge scientific approaches with ethical, legal, and policy approaches. CI's bedrock claim is that protecting privacy means protecting appropriate informational flows. It further stipulates that appropriate information flows are flows that comport with contextual informational norms (or rules), specified by the actors (senders, recipients and subjects), attributes (the type of information at hand) and transmission principles (types of constraints). CI posits multiple sources for norms, some of the most interesting associated with respective social contexts, continuously evolving as a function of cultural, historical, and material contingencies, including technological developments which bring new capabilities (e.g. email, biometric identification, social networks, data mining), types of information (e.g. email "metadata", CCTV feeds, webpage clicks) and actors (e.g. providers of social platforms). [See Section 2 for elaboration.]
Past work has taken the existence of contextual informational norms as a given (e.g. taking legal rules as points of departure), hence largely focused efforts on developing formal languages and logical frameworks for expressing these informational norms, detecting infractions, and developing approaches for accountability and enforcement [6] [7] [8] . Drawing on a combination of external sources, such as legal and policy documents, professional codes of conduct, findings of empirical social scientists, privacy advocates, and ethicists, and stipulations of sponsoring organizations and companies, systems developers and requirements engineers have taken norms as given. Typically leaving the discovery of norms outside the scope of system design, they have made extensive contributions to the technical field, such as, generating machine readable access rules and implementing complex constraints that map given rules.
In this paper, we demonstrate one approach to integrating and automating the discovery of contextual informational norms within a system. Ultimately, the norms it generates could form the foundation for future learning enabling a system to monitor the continuing evolution of norms, as happens in social life. Our work connects with the work of others by providing an alternative mechanism for discovering norms and expressing them in a logic, bypassing a need to rely on pre-existing societal norms-whether expressed in law, articulated by experts, or informally recognized in practice. It is important to note that we do not reject these alternative sources; only that we are offering an additional, systematic source that is particularly well suited for a range of systems, including information systems with social actors. We propose a crowdsourcing framework for automated discovery, verification and enforcement of contextual informational norms. Given a specific context, our crowdsourcing methodology [described more fully in Section 5] automatically generates several contextspecific privacy rule candidates, expressed in the CI format, that are presented to users in a crowdsourcing platform.
In this work, we use Amazon's Mechanical Turk (AMT) as a proxy, while in reality, one can restrict the crowdsourcing process to context-specific users. Based on responses that presented a majoritarian consensus, privacy norms were derived from the crowdsourced responses. Utilizing Datalog logic specification, we encoded these majoritarian rules, which we could then verify for consistency.
Specifically, our paper makes four major contributions: 1. Formal expression of the CI theoretical framework. Our work successfully operationalizes the fundamental construct of CI, namely, contextual informational norms comprising three key parameters: a) actors (senders, subjects and receivers of information, usually people or organizations); b) attributes (information types); and c) transmission principles that impose constraints on information flows. Such norms are subject to the requirements of respective social contexts, that is, "structured social settings" comprising social life [9] . 2. A crowdsourcing methodology for discovering informational (privacy) norms for a given context. We elicit informational norms based on a crowdsourcing approach that asks a large pool of respondents on AMT whether a set of automatically generated privacy statements that are based on the language of CI meets their privacy expectations. 3. Converting crowd-sourced responses to a corresponding privacy logic. To derive a functional privacy logic our system encodes structured informational norms discovered through crowdsourcing methodology using Datalog declarative language. 4. Verification of privacy norms. Our approach supports two types of verification. First, by encoding CI norms into Datalog, we can verify that all information flows are consistent with the specified norms. Second, using formal methods techniques, we can verify that the norms satisfy high-level properties that are not obvious from directly examining the norms. We discuss how our system captures, evaluates and verifies policies in Section 5.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we provide a brief overview of the CI theoretical framework and describe how our work fits into it. Related work is covered in Section 3. Section 4 describes our framework design. Section 5 discusses how we extract privacy norms using a crowd-sourcing approach, and outlines how we represent and evaluate CI norms in Datalog, while verifying additional high-level properties using the theorem prover Z3 [10] . Finally, we provide details on the evaluation of our system and conclude the paper with Sections 6 and 7, respectively.
Contextual Integrity
The theory of contextual integrity (CI) postulates that privacy is not necessarily about solitude [11] , secrecy [12] or control [13] but about the appropriateness of a given information flow within a particular context. There are three components to an information flow: actors (senders, recipients and subjects), attributes (the type of information at hand) and transmission principles (the constraints imposed on a particular information flow). Taken together, these components constitute context-relative informational norms. For instance, in the health context, the patient, acting in his capacity as both the sender and subject of an information flow, could be telling his doctor, the recipient, about his health issues, the attribute. The information flow would be guided by the transmission principle of confi-dentiality, which imposes constraints on the onward flow of this information to other parties. Exchange the doctor for a friend, and the transmission principle might be reciprocity instead, since friends tend to expect to hear about each other's problems. A patient, by contrast, does not expect to hear about the health issues of his doctor. This is because the context of health and the context of friendship have different overarching goals: the doctor is there to promote the patient's health; friends are there to support each other. An informational norm is breached when changes occur in either actors, attributes, or transmission principles within a given information flow. In other words, contextual integrity "is preserved when informational norms are respected and violated when informational norms are breached" [9] . In legal deliberations about privacy, the same intuition is captured by the concept of "reasonable expectation of privacy" [14] .
While CI, as a conceptual framework, is capable of revealing different aspects of contextual privacy, it does not express how to capture, encode and verifiably enforce these norms in practice. Past efforts [7, 8, 15] have, for the most part, taken certain privacy norms as givens, and have focused on deriving logical frameworks to express and enforce them. Automating the discovery of informational norms remains an important open question -one we address in our work.
Complicating the situation, CI recognizes that norms are constantly in the process of becoming, hence informational norms can also evolve as the sociotechnical environment changes. Although the theory of CI has a prima facie preference for entrenched informational norms, it allows for normative transformations when the resultant norms can better promote the values, goals, and ends of a given context. People learn and adopt implicit and explicit informational norms from their families, friends, and communities; by watching how people behave and how they react to other people's behavior; from educational training, the arts, and cultural activities; from the study of law and policy, and so forth. Consequently, capturing relevant operational norms is not an easy and straightforward process. Our personal preferences and our interests may deviate from what society collectively agrees upon; law and regulation, handbooks, as well as expert opinions may lag behind the current state of privacy expectations of the majority. The various sources of privacy rules play different roles in the regulation of privacy in society.
Here, we are interested in formally capturing CI's bedrock notion of appropriate information flows, that is, entrenched privacy expectations, formally represented by CI's context specific information flows. We have developed a systematic method of discovering these norms through crowdsourcing in an online environment, extracting and reaching a consensus on a set of operational norms. This is one among several possible approaches for norms discovery, at a given moment in time. Its advantages for system builders are that it offers a range of efficiencies, can be automated and updated reasonable quickly, and can be formalized. Prior work [16] [17] [18] [19] offers early validation for crowdsourcing methodologies, suggesting that large-scale surveys can be effective in discovering norms. Our work utilizes crowdsourcing as a means of approximating collective (common) privacy expectations. As described below, we have interpreted agreement above a stipulated threshold as a signal of societal consensus on contextual information flows.
Related Work
In this section we acknowledge important prior and adjacent work that is related to ours. This roughly falls into four different categories: a) Other AC frameworks; b) Other efforts adopting the CI framework for building privacy-preserving systems; c) Other compliance-based approaches to privacy-by-design (PbD); d) Other efforts utilizing crowd-sourcing to promote system privacy.
Other AC frameworks
Many other frameworks have been designed to manage access control to information and other privacypreserving functions. Barth et.al., [7] , provide a comprehensive comparison of the CI framework to other existing models such as Role-Based Access Control (RBAC), the eXtensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML), Enterprise Privacy Authentication Language (EPAL), and the Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P). RBAC. In RBAC, access control is defined in terms of available resources and users' roles that have access to it. Compared to RBAC, CI is a more generic framework that introduces additional attributes, namely contexts, subjects, as well as transmission principles, that capture more accurately the different dynamics according to which information is shared.
XACML. The eXtensible Access Control Markup
Language (XACML) is a generic XML-based markup language that allows specifying attributebased AC policies for resources. XACML can be used to implement Attributed Base Access Control (ABAC) as well as the RBAC scheme. We can also express the CI framework using XACML by capturing the contextual and information flow semantics behind the CI norms. P3P. The P3P language is designed to help websites describe their privacy polices with regards to users' data. In contrast to the CI framework, P3P is limited to policies involving only two parties, i.e., the website and the visitor, operating in a very specific, global context [7] .
Other works based on CI
In [7] the authors proposed a logical framework for reasoning about privacy expectations and privacy practices using CI. The framework uses first-order temporal logic (FOTL) to express norms by describing the actors that participate in each context, the roles these actors play, and their knowledge states, all at a specific point in time. While FOTL-based formalisms can model temporal properties related to contextual integrity, the logic itself is too expressive to serve as a suitable foundation for tools that mechanize reasoning about privacy norms in real-world systems. For example, the valid formulas of full FOTL are not even recursively enumerable. Consequently, any automated approach to reasoning about validity, respectively, satisfiability of formulas in full FOTL is inherently incomplete [20] . In [8] the authors propose computational and information models of Implicit Contextual Integrity in a social network. The main motivation behind this work is based on the idea that context in OSN is never explicitly defined and must be inferred from the information itself. The paper introduces the notion of an Assistant Agent which uses the defined information model to infer any implicit contexts, relates them to existing norms and stops undesirable information flows. In our work, we rely on the users to decide on valid and relevant information flows and contexts in the system. Similarly, Y. Krupa and L. Vercouter [15] looked into having an Assistant Agent be part of a Privacy as Contextual Integrity for the Agent Systems (PrivaCIAS) framework for open and decentralized virtual communities. The agent is designed to assist users with preserving their information privacy as well as detecting other users that violate the established privacy norms. The framework is based on a trust model where agents gossip about their "experiences" to inform other agents of any violations as well as provide passive feedback. The ultimate goal is to socially exclude "bad" agents from the system. While this work focuses on enforcing CI norms in a distributed environment, it does not discuss how to extract the prevailing set of norms in the first place. Our framework can complement such initiatives by providing a mechanism for extracting CI privacy norms from the community of users and verify their consistency.
Compliance-based approaches to PbD
Rising to the call for PbD, numerous approaches have been invented to map system constraints to privacy policies that are generated external to these systems. Two examples, are Sen, et. al. in [21] and Breaux and Anton in [22] . Sen, et. al. have developed LEGALEASE, a language with precise semantics that enables enterprises to express privacy policies against which practices can be checked for compliance. With similar goals, Breaux and Anton have proposed a methodology for extracting implementable software requirements from privacy and security regulatory requirements expressed in legal language that is sometimes vague and ambiguous. The intention in both examples is similar to our own in that it seeks to translate privacy requirements expressed in natural language (assuming this covers legal language) into formally expressed rules that allow for compliance checking. The threat scenarios, however, are quite different. Further, both examples start with externally generated privacy norms, which they seek to express in formal language.
Other uses of crowdsourcing to generate privacy rules
One effort that is quite close in spirit to our own is [23] which seeks to ease the burden on users when tailoring privacy policies on mobile apps to accurately reflect their privacy preferences. The system clusters users according to their willingness to share information with app providers and configures settings on future apps based on the position in a cluster. Relevant differences are (i) that it applies to a dyadic relationship between the user and app provider, and (ii) it seeks to model preferences while our work aims to model social norms. Similarly Tohn [24] has proposed the SuperEgo system, which uses crowdsourcing to enhance location pri-vacy management in mobile applications. SuperEgo uses the perception of the crowd to predict the privacy preferences of an individual. The system relies on a crowdopinion model and a mixture of decision-making strategies to classify the information as private or not. Although this work is conceptually similar in that it uses crowdsourcing to infer relevant privacy policies for the user, it is limited to a location-based privacy context. As noted by the author, the CI framework is more expressive and capable of capturing privacy-rules in a range of different contexts.
In summary, previous contributions focused on applying the CI framework to enforce privacy norms in different domains. Our work builds on these efforts by capturing relevant norms in a given context and then proposes a privacy-preserving framework that efficiently encodes them into a privacy logic and enforces them in any information system. Finally, our approach allows us to verify the selected privacy rules for consistency.
Framework Design
In this section we describe our privacy-preserving framework for crowdsourcing a verifiable and enforceable CIbased privacy logic.
Design Goals
The main goal of our framework is to facilitate building a system that effectively crowdsources, encodes and verifiably enforces privacy norms for any given information flow. We consider the following design goals: Crowdsourcing norms. Our framework allows systems to integrate and leverage crowdsourcing techniques to capture users' privacy expectations and map them onto CI privacy norms. Privacy logic. The framework will encode CI norms into a privacy logic and provide functionality to the systems by enforcing it onto the information flows. Verification. The framework will guarantee that all information flows are consistent with the enforced privacy logic, as well as provide functionality to verify additional high-level properties behind it. Feasibility. The resulting system will be able to capture, encode, verify and enforce privacy norms in real-time. Scalability. The system will be scalable to handle large numbers of information flows.
Framework components
In this section we describe the main framework components that support the system in its operational states, as depicted by Figure 1 . The system presents users with a set of questions based on a specific domain ontology. The purpose of the questions is twofold: to provide users with a set of possible privacy norms and to elicit feedback from users about their perception towards those norms The feedback is then used as part of a learning and adjusting mechanism to revise the enforced policies. Norms crowdsourcing. The question generation (QG) state takes as input only the list of parameters associated with a context, including the list of actors, information types, and transmission principles. Later, QG generates questions from the existing privacy norms. Based on the crowd-worker responses, the framework will derive the corresponding CI norms. Privacy logic. At the Learning state, the answers to the questions are analyzed to derive a set with an over-the-threshold approval rank 1 . Next, at the Encoding state, these questions are encoded into a set of operational norms by using Datalog; they form the privacy logic of the system. The logic is passed on to the System state which is responsible for their verification and enforcement. Verification. All information that is shared though the system is governed by privacy norms. Using Datalog encoding, the system evaluates every information flow against current privacy policies. Furthermore, the system is capable of verifying other metaassertions for the derived privacy logic, i.e., validating that the enforced norms are consistent and the disapproved information flows impermissible.
The system is constantly evolving; as it traverses through states new norms are introduced and old ones are re-evaluated. Norms that at some point are discarded and not approved can regain "popularity" as more users join and use the system. In the next section, we describe the process behind each of the components in greater detail.
Fig. 1.
Our framework is designed to support several system states. Users are queried for feedback on privacy rules using a Yes-or-No question template. The system will learn and rank the norms accordingly. Norms with ranks above the set threshold will be encoded into the operational set which will be enforced by the system. 
Privacy through Crowdsourcing
In this section we describe the procedures behind the crowdsourcing of norms, as well as the encoding and verification of the system's privacy logic.
Constructing questions
As depicted by the example in Figure 2 , CI norms contain the following elements: actors (senders, subjects and recipients), attributes (information types), and transmission principles (constraints on flow).
Below From the answers to the crowdsourced survey we extracted a truth table describing the information flows that are admissible in this context. The admissibility is determined by a rank-threshold which is set in the system configurations. The learned truth table represents a formal specification of the contextual privacy norms. We refer to the formal specification of a privacy norm as a privacy rule.
Representation and verified enforcement
We use the declarative programming language Datalog [25] to formally represent contexts, for evaluating the privacy rules in these contexts, and for automating critical aspects of the crowdsourced learning component. Datalog is a well-studied language and formalism that has found numerous applications, including the analysis of social networks [26] and as a language for expressing privacy and security policies (see, e.g., [27] [28] [29] ). Its relevance for the formalization of contextual integrity has been noticed before [30] . Our main motivation for building our formalization on Datalog can be summarized as follows: -The encoding of contextual privacy rules to Datalog is elegant and easy to understand. In particular, we can leverage Datalog's query mechanism to automatically evaluate the learned rules of concrete contexts and check properties of these rules. We provide several examples below. -Datalog forms a fragment of first-order predicate logic. Hence, the language has a well understood semantics. In particular, this allows us to use powerful first-order theorem provers to automatically prove high-level privacy properties of the norms that we learn for a specific context. -Datalog provides a good trade-off between expressiveness and complexity. In particular, Datalog's computational model is not Turing complete, which means that all queries are guaranteed to terminate. We mostly restrict ourselves to a specific fragment of Datalog referred to as unions of conjunctive queries. This fragment is well-studied in the AI, logic programming, and database communities. In particular, efficient algorithms for its treatment have already been developed [31] .
Encoding Contextual Privacy in Datalog
Datalog is a fragment of the logical programming language Prolog. A Datalog program consists of clauses that define predicates on entities. Our Datalog encoding of contextual privacy specifies predicates on entities that stand for contexts, actors, attributes, and transmission principles as described in Section 4. Central to the encoding is the predicate.
allowed(Ctx, Sndr, Recp, Subj, Attr, Tr)
This predicate models that in context Ctx, actor Sndr is allowed to send information on attribute Attr of actor Subj to actor Recp under transmission principle Tr. For example, the following fact states that in the classroom context (denoted by class), bob can send his own grade to alice with transmission principle confidentiality.
allowed(class, bob, alice, bob, grade, confidentiality).
In order to be able to express the privacy rules, we introduce a ternary predicate inrole(Context, Actor, Role), which models that in the given context, the given actor is in the specified role. For example, the following fact states that in the classroom context, bob is in the role of student inrole(class, bob, student).
The predicate allowed captures the rules of all privacy contexts. The individual rules for each context are stated using clauses that contain the predicate allowed in the head. As an example, the following clause codifies the rule that professors can let any student know her own grade upon her request: allowed(class, Sndr, Recp, Subj, grade, need) :-inrole(class, Sndr, professor), inrole(class, Recp, student), Subj = Recp.
Note the close correspondence between this clause and the shape of the survey questions discussed in Section 4.
A Datalog program is executed by evaluating a query that asks whether a certain conjunction of predicates holds true according to the clauses in the program. Suppose that in our social platform we have a classroom context whose actors are described by the following facts:
inrole(class, bob, student). inrole(class, alice, student). inrole(class, steve, professor).
Then we can use the query mechanism to check whether a specific information flow satisfies all the specified privacy rules. For instance, given the above privacy rule and facts, the query ?-allowed(class, steve, bob, bob, grade, need).
evaluates to true, indicating that the corresponding information flow is admissible. On the other hand, the query ?-allowed(class, steve, alice, bob, grade, need).
evaluates to false, indicating that this flow is not permitted.
Privacy logic verification
Datalog allows us to formally specify CI rules in a declarative manner. In particular, we can use the query mechanism of a Datalog interpreter to check that all information flows in a social platform are consistent with the specified rules. The semantics of Datalog guarantees that no norm-violating flows will be permitted at runtime. The fact that Datalog provides a formally defined semantics for CI rules has another important advantage: it enables us to verify that the rules of a given context satisfy desirable high-level privacy properties that are not immediately evident from the rules. For example, we may want to verify that our rules do not permit the flow of confidential information to third parties. We can check such properties statically before the rules are in effect.
One specific application of formal verification in our proposed crowd-sourced learning approach is that we can check whether the rules that have been approved by the crowd are not violating the rules that have been disapproved. In particular, we can leverage formal verification to facilitate the automatic adjustment of the threshold that determines which rules are considered to be approved. In the following, we describe in more detail how such static verification tasks can be automated.
The problem of verifying that a given set of rules R satisfies a given property P amounts to checking logical validity of the implication R ⇒ P , or dually, that the conjunction R ∧ ¬P is unsatisfiable. For simple properties P , the latter can be checked directly using Datalog queries. However, in general, Datalog queries are not sufficiently expressive to verify complex high-level properties. Fortunately, we can embed Datalog in a more expressive logic that is still amenable to automated reasoning and yields tractable performance for the static verification of high-level properties in practice.
Datalog is a fragment of first-order predicate logic. Specifically, suppose we are given a set of rules R = {R 1 , . . . , R n } where each rule R i is specified by a Datalog clause of the form
and the atoms C i,j are either in_role predicates over the given variables in the head of the clause or equalities between these variables and constants such as student, grade, etc. Then the semantics of these clauses is captured by the following quantified formula:
This formula falls into Effective Propositional Logic (EPR), a decidable fragment of first-order predicate logic [32] . Several automated theorem provers implement decision procedures for EPR, e.g., the Satisfiability Modulo Theories solver Z3 [10] . If the privacy property P of interest is itself expressible in EPR, then we can use Z3 to automatically check that the rules R guarantee P . Fortunately, many properties of interest are indeed expressible in EPR. For example, the following EPR formula expresses that in the classroom context, a professor should not be allowed to send a student's grade to any other student, unless that other student is a TA:
Note that this property cannot be checked with a simple Datalog query. We need the additional expressiveness provided by EPR. More generally, EPR can express properties about transitive information flows that involve arbitrarily long sequences of information exchanges. Since the satisfiability problem for EPR is decidable, we can verify these properties fully automatically using tools such as Z3. In particular, if a specified property is not guaranteed by the rules, the theorem prover will produce a model describing an information flow that respects the rules but violates the property. Using this model, we can then identify the rules that are responsible for this property violation.
Evaluation
In our experiments we focused on evaluating the following aspects: the effectiveness of the crowdsourcing approach to learn CI rules as well as the effectiveness of using formal verification technology to guarantee privacy properties of the derived privacy rules.
Survey design
We begin by describing the survey and the metrics used to select operational norms based on the feedback provided to the survey questions. For this experiment, we considered the educational context to test whether the CI framework would be able to better encapsulate users' privacy expectations. We constructed a specific survey to perform crowd-sourced learning of contextual norms. Our target population was US residents, between 18-26 years of age, and currently enrolled in (or graduated within the past three years from) an institution of higher education in the United States. We conducted these surveys using an online survey designed with Qualtrics and administered on Amazon's Mechanical Turk.
We used a python script (see Appendix) to generate the initial set of norms based on the most common CI parameters in a classroom setting (e.g., teachers and students as actors; grades as attribute; knowledge or consent as transmission principles). To decrease the total number of questions asked, we had an expert perform a preliminary scan of the norms to identify the ones that clearly did not make any sense. Rather than manually going through the questions one by one, the expert considered only valid pairs of senders and attributes. From the expert's feedback, we introduced some restrictions to remove questions that are blatantly nonsensical (e.g., university librarians cannot be senders of content posted on online learning systems). With these restrictions we ended up with a total of 2,115 questions.
Nevertheless, since we cannot ask a total of 2,115 questions in one survey session, we decided that we would first, randomize the questions and second, divide them up into 24 surveys (21 with 88 questions, 3 with 89 questions) with about 30 respondents each. That way, we would be able to ask all possible questions within this context (i.e., achieve completeness) at a reasonable cost ($2 per user per survey, plus AMT fees).
Some of the remaining questions, while perhaps valid, are not applicable in the real world and thus make little sense to the survey participant (e.g., it might be unlikely for certain senders to have access to certain attributes). We therefore included the answer option: "Does not make any sense" (DMS). We ran two types of surveys: One option for DMS In order to avoid people gaming the survey by clicking DMS for all questions, we decided that, if selected, the answer option would branch to: "Why? Please explain:" so respondents would have to justify their answer. Three options for DMS For this type of survey, we removed the option for users to provide the reason, and included explicit options for the DMS answer:
1) The sender is unlikely to have the information 2) The receiver would already have the information 3)
The question is ambiguous.
Henceforth, we refer to the first and second structures as DMS-1 and DMS-3 type questions, respectively. Of the 24 surveys, the first 8 were of type DMS-1 (704 questions) and the remaining 16 were DMS-3 (1411 questions). After a preliminary analysis of the results for the first eight surveys, we realized that respondents were unwilling to select the DMS option, presumably because of the additional effort required (filling in the blank) in responding to it. Consequently, we modified the DMS option to reflect the most common inconsistencies caused by the automatic question generation process. Unfortunately, due to budget constraints, we could not rerun the first eight surveys with the modified format. In total, we had 697 respondents to the 24 surveys: 246 for the DMS-1 surveys and 451 for the DMS-3 surveys; each user had to respond to 88-89 questions, with 28-32 respondents per question in each survey. The average completion time per user and survey was around 14 minutes.
Evaluation of rule extraction
In the first part of the evaluation of the survey data, our goal was to examine to what extent users can reach a consensus on operational privacy rules and what metrics could be used to extract these rules from the responses. Specifically, we considered three metrics in our evaluation: the norm approval score, the user's approval score and the divergence score.
Norm approval score (NA)
Our most important metric is the norm approval score (NA). This is our measure of what question is approved by the community for the operational privacy-rule set. We define the NA score of question i as follows:
Here, Y i,j is defined to be 1 iff respondent j answered "Yes" to question i. Similarly, N i,j and DMS i,j indicate whether user j answered "No", respectively, chose "Does not make sense". Thus, NA i is the ratio between the total number of Yes answers and the number of all answers for question i across all m respondents. A norm is considered approved if its NA exceeds a certain threshold, e.g., a simple majority (> 50%).
User's approval score (UA)
This metric measures the relative number of norms that have been approved by a given respondent. Formally, the value UA j for respondent j is defined as
where n is the total number of questions in the survey that j responded to. Note that the sum in the denominator may not always add up to n since some users did not answer all of the questions.
Divergence score (DS)
This metric looks at how the answers of individual respondents vary from the norms that have been approved and disapproved by the whole community subject to a given NA threshold. Intuitively, it quantifies how dissatisfied a user is with the extracted set of operational norms. Formally, the divergence score DS j of respondent j is defined as
Here, the bit u i,j is defined to be 1 iff respondent j approved the norm described by question i and c i is defined to be 1 iff the community as a whole approved the norm. Hence, DS j indicates the number of times respondent j's expectations differed from the operational privacy rule set that was enforced based on the chosen NA threshold.
Summary of survey data
We summarize relevant results for the DMS-1 and DMS-3 populations in Table 1 . The number behind the "Yes > 50" and "Yes ≥ 66 " columns reflects questions succeeding the respective NA thresholds. We also list the number of questions that were explicitly disapproved by the majority of the users with regards to chosen thresholds under the "No > 50" and "No ≥ 66" columns. For 57 questions across both the DMS-1 and DMS-3 surveys, the respondents could not reach any agreement because the number of "Yes" and "No" answers was identical. Although this is a small percentage of the total number of questions, it highlights an important point: some information flows require closer attention because users might not reach an agreement on them; if this is the case our design will allow individuals to select norms according to their personal preferences. This will ultimately lead to new (and more refined) norms being introduced into the system. We listed the full text of the unresolved questions in the appendix. The DMS-1 and DMS-3 surveys consisted of different questions. However, since the questions were randomly distributed across all surveys, we can compare the data obtained for the two survey types to justify our decision to switch from the DMS-1 to the DMS-3 format. Specifically, after analyzing the data from the two types of surveys, we noticed that compared to the DMS-1 type questions, the relative number of respondents opting for the DMS option in the DMS-3 surveys significantly increased. Presumably the reason for this is that the respondents had pre-defined options to elaborate on their DMS choices and were not forced to explain in their own words why they chose that option. This leads us to believe that DMS-3 type questions better reflected the users' perceptions. We performed more surveys with DMS-3. Thus, the remaining results pre- sented in this section are with respect to the DMS-3 type questions only, unless otherwise specified.
Norm approval thresholds
Next, we analyzed the capability of the approach to reach a consensus for different NA thresholds and how these threshold choices affect the users' approval and divergence scores. We focused first on the two thresholds of 50% and 66%. Figure 3 depicts two boxplots for all users across all DMS-3 type questions for the two NA thresholds. Both populations look very similar. To verify the difference in means of these two population we A Tukey HSD test identified that using the 66% threshold increases the DS score by 4.8%. Figure 5 depicts a scatter plot that shows the number of users with the same DS score across all DMS-3 surveys for an NA threshold of 66%. The plot indicates a large concentration of respondents with a relatively small DS. This means that overall the users are satisfied with the operational privacy rule set chosen by the system for this specific NA threshold. Furthermore, to understand how the DS varies across all the different thresholds, we calculated a combined DS for all possible NA thresholds (0% to 100%) and normalized it by the number of total users that had taken the survey. The normalization provides us with the combined DS score of all users per threshold. Our results, depicted by Figure 4 , show that while the threshold is at its minimum, DS is at the maximum. Recall that DS represents the level of dissatisfaction of users. We can therefore interpret this result as follows: while the threshold is low, more questions are approved, meaning that a significant number of privacy rules that users prefer to disapprove are included in the operational set. The lowest DS values are in the 40% to 60% NA threshold range. The best candidates for an actual threshold choice therefore seem to lie in that range. Interestingly, the DS converges around the 35 mark from 66% to 100%. This shows that, in our surveys, more people opt to disapprove norms than approve them. Figure 6 shows that there is a linear relationship between UA and DS for the individual users for a 66% NA threshold. Linear regression analysis confirms this (r 2 = 0.87, formula: DS = 0.69 * UA + 2.044). The 66%
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NA threshold makes it hard to approve privacy rules; users with a very high UA score will often be disappointed, thus having higher DS. Conversely, users that have a lower UA will more likely agree with the community rules. We can observe a similar pattern with an NA threshold of 50% on Figure 7 ; however, relative to the 66% threshold, user satisfaction is slightly higher as more privacy rules are approved on average.
Verification of extracted rules
In our final experiment, we evaluated the effectiveness of formal verification technology to assist the crowdsourced learning of privacy rules. We used the theorem prover Z3 to check whether the rules extracted from the survey data guarantee certain privacy properties by encoding both the rules and the properties into Effectively Propositional Logic (EPR) as described in Section 5.4.
Specifically, our goal was to assess whether we can use Z3 to automatically check the consistency of the rules that we derived from the crowd-sourced data for a chosen threshold. We chose the 50% threshold to determine which norms are approved according to the crowd-sourced survey data. For this threshold, as depicted by Table 1 , 587 (total approved norms with DMS-1 and DMS-3) of our total 2115 norms were approved. We then encoded these approved norms into an EPR formula and used Z3 to check for each of the 1528 remaining disapproved norms whether the corresponding information flow was indeed prevented by the approved rules.
In the following, we refer to the property that the information flow of a disapproved norm is prevented as a negative norm. Each negative norm was checked by sending a separate satisfiability query to Z3. We performed two variants of this experiment that differed slightly in the semantic interpretation of contextual roles. We describe these variants in more detail below. The two experiments were run on a laptop computer equipped with an Intel Core I5 CPU at 2.67GHz and 4GB RAM running Ubuntu Linux. For both variants of the experiment, the cumulative time needed for checking all negative norms was less than 3 seconds. The memory consumption was negligible.
Simplistic role semantics
In our first experiment, we considered a simplistic semantics of the in_role predicate where we assumed that roles are mutually exclusive. That is, an actor cannot take on two different roles in the same context (e.g., a librarian cannot at the same time be a professor). Under this assumption, we were able to verify that the approved rules guarantee all negative norms.
Realistic role semantics
While many roles in the educational context are indeed mutually exclusive, this is not true in general. For example, a TA is typically a student and a department chair is always a professor. In our second experiment, we considered a realistic model that took these implicit relationships between the different roles in a classroom context into account. With the realistic model, we were unable to prove that some of the negative norms were ensured by the approved rules. For example, one of the violated negative norms pertained to a professor shar- ing a student's test result with other students. Such an information flow was permitted by one of the approved norms, which allowed a professor to share a test result with a TA. Since a TA may also be a student, the negative norm was indeed violated. We find the outcome of our experiment very encouraging. On the one hand, it shows that formal verification techniques can be used to automatically prove privacy properties of the derived norms. On the other hand, it shows that formal verification can also help to identify imprecisions in the survey questions from which the privacy rules are derived. These imprecisions can then be weeded out in an iterative refinement process.
Summary and Conclusion
In this paper we described a framework for crowdsourcing verifiable operational privacy rules (OPRs) based on the theory of contextual integrity. After submitting norm candidates to Amazon Mechanical Turk workers for their feedback we admitted those which met an approval metric beyond a certain threshold into the OPR set. Our framework uses the Datalog declarative language to encode OPRs into a privacy logic and enforces it onto the information flows.
Our evaluation shows that we can extract up to 96.3% of privacy rules with a simple majority threshold; evidently, the particular choice of an approval threshold and the question format have a significant impact on the final OPR set. To facilitate this effort, we introduced the DS metric which provides a sense of how the community "feels" about the selected OPR set, and hence can be used to fine-tune the approval threshold on an ongoing basis to ensure that the majority of users actually support the enforced OPR logic. Furthermore, the system can leverage formal verification techniques to verify that the OPR set satisfies higher-level privacy properties that may not be obvious at first sight. In particular, we can use formal verification to detect inconsistencies in OPR sets that can be eliminated by refining the survey questions.
Our results leave us optimistic about the feasibility of a full-fledged information system that operates based on the design principles of crowdsourcing, formal verification, and contextual integrity. Future work includes an in-depth investigation into more elaborate approval and divergence metrics, an extension of our design to handle inter-domain privacy rules as well as the release of a prototype system based on privacy norms discovered using the methods we have developed.
Looking further into the future, our work paves the way towards information systems that operate on a foundation of substantive privacy rules that reflect the rough consensus of given communities. These could include communities across the domains of education, health, or more general social domains. The mechanisms we have developed for extracting, expressing, and validating a set of common rules could be integrated into such systems. Discovering a set of common rules through crowdsourcing, e.g. as we have done with Amazon's Me-chanical Turk, can be viewed as an efficient bootstrapping first move to populate a system at startup. By incorporating these mechanisms into information/social systems, user feedback can be continuously elicited, which will enable a system to refresh rules continuously to reflect evolving community norms and standards.
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